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I. INTRODUCTION
In the famous Steelworkers Trilogy' of 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court gave
a ringing endorsement to the labor arbitration process. That included both
judicial enforcement of a union-employer agreement to arbitrate and judicial
enforcement of an arbitrator's award. Doubts about coverage of an arbitration
provision were to be resolved in favor of arbitration. In dealing with an arbitral
award, courts were confined to matters of due process and the legality of the
award and were not to review the merits of the arbitrator's interpretive
decision. Despite that sweeping triumph, in 1976 the lead union lawyer in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, by then Berkeley Law Professor David Feller, was
lamenting what he described as the "coming end of arbitration's golden age."2
Feller's concern was that the increasing role of statutory law in labor relations
would displace the former autonomy of the "system of industrial self-
governance" constructed by employers and unions through collective
bargaining. 3 Feller may have been overly pessimistic, but legislative
developments have certainly moved in that direction.4
Feller was quite explicit in his 1976 presentation that he was not referring
to a decline in the use of labor arbitration, but rather to a diminution in the
independence of arbitrators in dealing with labor-management disputes.5 Yet,
' United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In arbitration,
disputing parties agree to have a neutral third party resolve the issue by a final and binding
decision. The first two Trilogy cases dealt with enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
Enterprise Wheel dealt with review of an arbitral award. Refinements on enforcing
arbitration agreements came in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986). Strict limits on overturning awards as contravening
supposed public policy were imposed in United Paperworkers International Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1987); E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S.
57, 62-67 (2000).
2 David E. Feller, The Coming End ofArbitration 's Golden Age, in 29 ARBITRATION-
1976, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 97 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1977).
Id. at 107.
4 There would seem to be no need for citing the broad array of federal and state laws
enacted since the 1960s prohibiting employment discrimination, protecting employee
safety, health and retirement benefits, requiring advance notice of plant closings, and so
on. However, for a general overview see Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment
Law in Two Transitional Decades, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 495 (2004).
' Feller, supra note 2, at 97. Feller went so far as to insist that in the golden age, labor
arbitrators were not even engaged in contract interpretation in the usual sense. In a
discharge case, for example, he declared that the principal issue is not whether there was a
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in fact, the decline in union density since the 1.970s, especially in private
employment, has been dramatic. Union membership was 25.7% of the U.S.
workforce in 1970; it is 11.1 % today.6 Because of the continuing growth of
the labor force, the drop in union membership was less precipitous, but it went
from 21.2 million in 1970 to 14.8 million in 2015.' In the mid-1970s, when
Professor Feller spoke, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) reported an annual total
of 8,268 arbitration awards issued under their auspices. 8 After rising
substantially during the 1980s and 1990s, the figure fell to about 3,850 by
2014.9 After its "golden age," labor arbitration seems to have been tarnished
not only in the autonomy of the process but also in sheer numbers.
The major developments in employer-employee arbitration currently do
not involve labor arbitration, that is, arbitration between employers and
unions. The focus is on employment arbitration, arbitration between
employers and individual employees. Beginning around 1980, nearly all the
states judicially modified the standard American doctrine of employment-at-
will whereby, absent a statutory or contractual prohibition, an employer could
fire an employee "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong."1 Under the new regime, grounded in expansive contract and public
policy theories, wrongfully discharged employees often reaped bonanzas in
court suits, with California jury awards averaging around $425,000." Many
employers responded by requiring employees to agree, as a condition for
"contract breach" but whether the "punishment is appropriate to the nature of the offense."
Id. at 104. One need not follow Feller to that extent to recognize the value of his insights
about arbitrator autonomy.
6 DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 2 (Courtney D. Gifford ed., 1984-85);
BUR. LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY 1 (2016) (Unity
density in the private sector is now only 6.7%).
7 DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 6.
8 Dennis R. Nolan & Roger 1. Abrams, Trends in Private Sector Grievance
Arbitration, in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 69 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita
eds., 1997).
9 Id.; AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, 2014 LABOR CASELOAD STATISTICAL DATA 4
(May 20, 2015), on file with author; FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., 2014 ANN.
REP. 3 (2015). It is estimated, however, that the AAA and FMCS may account for only
about a fifth of all labor and employment arbitrations. Others are handled through state
agencies, "permanent" umpireships, and direct appointments. See Nolan & Abrams, supra
note 8, at 68.
10 Payne v. W. & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 24-26, 33-37 (1988); Clifford Palefsky, Wrongful Termination
Litigation: "Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 MICH. B.J. 776 (1983); BUREAU OF NAT'L
AFFAIRS, INC., DAILY LAB. REP. 35 (1987).
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getting or keeping a job, that all employment disputes, including statutory
claims, would be resolved through arbitration systems established by the
employers rather than through suits in federal or state court. The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld such mandatory arbitration in the much-debated Gilmer case in
1991.12
In its lead story on the first page of the Sunday, November 1, 2015 edition,
the New York Times opened a three-part series with the provocative headline,
"Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice." 13 The subhead summed
it up, "Vast Trend Locks Americans Out of Court-Rulings Greatly Favor
Business." The article went on to say: "[b]y inserting individual arbitration
clauses into a soaring number of consumer and employment contracts,
companies.. .devised a way to circumvent the courts and bar people from
joining together in class-action lawsuits, realistically the only tool citizens
have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices."'
14
All three Times articles quite appropriately cite numerous examples of
abuses in the arbitration system. But the casual reader will have heard nothing
about labor arbitration, where relatively well-matched employers and unions
have negotiated a dispute-resolution system that has stood the test of time for
its fairness, speed, and economy. More important for our purposes, the Times
articles make no effort to point out certain advantages of even mandatory
arbitration for employees and consumers. The articles thus fail dismally to
provide a balanced picture of a complex subject. A more tempered overview
will be the aim of the remainder of this paper. Is labor and employment
arbitration indeed confronting a mid-life crisis today, or is it actually possible
that such arbitration has the opportunity for a new "golden age"?
12 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (by 2008, 25% of
the companies in a survey reported by the American Arbitration Association required
nonunion employment disputes to be arbitrated). See ADR News, 2008 Litigation Trends
Survey Released, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 7 (2008-09). See also David Lewin, Employee Voice
and Mutual Gains, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 60TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASS'N 61-83 (2008) (354 of 757 nonunion businesses surveyed
in 2007, or 46.8%, had created employment arbitration programs). Do nonunion arbitration
systems provide unions with a new organizing device by representing nonunion grievants?
See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor
Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1682 (2014).
13 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2016, at Al.
14 ]d.
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II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Evolving Principles
In concluding in Gilmer that an employer could enforce an arbitration
agreement to resolve an employee's claim under a statute, 15 the Supreme
Court stressed that the employee had suffered no loss of substantive rights; it
was merely a change of forum. 16 Moreover, the employee was not precluded
from filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
only his own court action was barred. 17 It is also very important that the Court
declared that there must be no impairment of the employee's capacity to
"effectively... vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum.'
18
In subsequent decisions the Court majority moved considerably away
from this emphasis on the need for arbitration to "effectively vindicate" the
employee's rights. 19 Several of these cases involved mandatory consumer
15 The statute at issue in Gilmer was the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
16 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-28. Gilmer's decision under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (2012), was reaffirmed in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)
(holding, 5-4, that the FAA exempts only contracts of transportation workers from judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements). For a fuller picture of the legal status of arbitration
before Gilmer, see generally John Kagel, Arbitration and Due Process: The Way We Were
at the Time ofGilmer, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 267 (2007).
17 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. The Court has since held that an individual's agreement to
arbitrate employment disputes does not prevent the EEOC from seeking victim-specific
relief in court, including reinstatement, back pay, and damages. EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The EEOC does not have the resources, however, to litigate all
meritorious cases and must leave many to the charging parties to pursue on their own. See,
e.g., Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 219 (1995).
18 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 30-32 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). In an earlier case, the Supreme Court held an
arbitrator's adverse decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not prevent a
black employee from pursuing his claim in court that his discharge was racially
discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2012). Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974). There, the Court
concluded that, unlike in Gilmer, the arbitrator was not authorized to prevent subsequent
statutory claims. Id. at 59. The Court in Gilmer also found that Gardner-Denver involved
a "tension" between union representation and individual statutory rights. Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 35.
"9 See Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the Supreme Court's Arbitration
Jurisprudence (forthcoming; draft on file with author, at 34-35), for a detailed account of
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arbitration rather than employment arbitration but the principles are potentially
applicable to both. In Green Tree Financial Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, the Court
recognized that large arbitration costs could prevent a party from vindicating
federal statutory rights but held (5-4) that the party resisting arbitration had the
burden of proving that fact.2 0 The mere "risk" of such prohibitive costs was
"too speculative."
21
Two more recent David-and-Goliath commercial cases effectively shrunk
the slingshot in the weaker parties' hands. In each instance, the mandatory
arbitration agreement prohibited class actions in any arbitration. In AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, cell phone customers brought a class action in
federal court to prevent an allegedly fraudulent sales tax charge of $30.22
Lower courts denied the company's motion to compel arbitration on the
grounds that the denial of class actions in these circumstances was
unconscionable under California state law.2 3 Without grouping claims, pursuit
of them was financially unfeasible. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
makes arbitration agreements valid and enforceable "save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."24 Nonetheless,
this story. See also Michael Z. Green, Retaliatory Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201,202-04 (2014).
20 Green Tree Financial Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-91 (2000).
21 Id. at 91. But cf Nesbitt v. FCHN, Inc., 811 F.3d 371, 380-81 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Plaintiff met burden of showing prohibitive costs and arbitration was denied). Randolph
would apparently have left the adequacy of arbitration in vindicating rights to be decided
by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90-92. Later, the Court
seemed to indicate the issue should be handled by the arbitrator, at least in the first instance.
See PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405-07 (2003). On the question of
arbitration costs, a distinguished labor scholar and former arbitrator, Judge Harry Edwards,
wrote for a federal court of appeals in declaring that a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement would be upheld only if, inter alia, the employer would pay all the arbitrator's
costs in resolving the employee's claims. Cole v. Bums Int'l Security Services, 106 F.3d
1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997). That bright-line judicial rule would be far more protective of
employees, preferably in my view with the qualification that claimants could be required
to pay a filing fee no greater than that required by the applicable federal district court.
22 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011).
23 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148,113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (2005)
(class action waivers unconscionable when designed to prevent recovery of relatively small
monetary claims). California would apply that rule to contracts generally, not just
arbitration agreements.
24 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Several federal courts of appeals have adopted the very
technical requirement that to fall within the savings clause, the state rule must apply to all
contracts, since the FAA speaks of "any contract." David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, Purposivism, andState Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217,1231-1232 (2013).
Cf Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 431-34 (9th Cir. 2015)
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the Supreme Court held (5-4) that the FAA preempted the state law because
it stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment" of the FAA's objectives with
the "overarching purpose of the FAA" being described as "the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings." 25 For the majority, Justice Scalia castigated class actions in
arbitration as overly formal, slower, costlier, and riskier for defendants. 26 The
Court concluded that arbitration is "poorly suited" to class actions, 27 despite
its common use in "policy" or class grievances in labor arbitration. Justice
Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
28
In the second case, American Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
a group of merchants that accepted Amex credit cards brought a class action
alleging the company used its monopoly power to extract excessive
transaction fees. 29 The plaintiffs responded to Amex's motion to compel
arbitration by submitting an economist's declaration that the cost of proving a
federal antitrust violation would vastly exceed any individual plaintiff's likely
recovery. 30 Speaking again through Justice Scalia, the Court first noted that
the FAA's text "reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter
of contract.... And consistent with that text, courts must 'rigorously enforce'
arbitration agreements according to their terms." 31 The Court went on that no
congressional command in the antitrust laws required rejection of the waiver
clause. Indeed, the "effective vindication" exception was said to have
originated in dictum.32 Summing up, the Court declared that "the fact that it is
not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not
constitute the elimination of the right topursue that remedy., 33 The Court thus
held (5-3) that the waiver clause was valid.34
(declining to enforce class action ban on grounds state law applied to any such contract
provision in a court action). FAA policy barring discrimination against arbitration would
seem satisfied if the state law applies generally to the contract provision at issue in
arbitration.




2 Id. at 357. Justices Breyer and Kagan, however, now seem to acquiesce in the
Concepcion approach to claims under state law, as seen in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
136 S.Ct. 463, 464-65 (2015) (6-3 decision).
29 Am. Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013).
3 0 Id at 2308.
31 Id. at 2309 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
32 Id. at 2310.
331d. at 2311.
34ld. at 2312.
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Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg in dissent,
arguing strongly that Italian Colors was quite different from Concepcion.
35
For Justice Kagan, the key was that Concepcion was a preemption case, with
the FAA prevailing over a conflicting state law, while Italian Colors involved
rights under federal antitrust statutes, so that the effective-vindication
principle was directly implicated.36
Justice Scalia was a master logician. The trouble with pure logic, however,
is that an unsound premise can lead one unerringly to a faulty conclusion.
Justice Scalia had to deny the premise that the "effective vindication" of rights
was the underlying prerequisite that justified Gilmer and its progeny in
substituting arbitration for court actions in pursuing substantive rights, most
specifically federal statutory rights. Only the exclusion of that basic premise
from the syllogism enabled Justice Scalia to make what appears a fairly
plausible and logical case. In its place Justice Scalia invoked the seemingly
absolute premise that the FAA requires, absent congressional demurral, the
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms, as if
there were no longer any role for judicial intervention on public policy
grounds. That is the unsound premise on which Justice Scalia based his case
against unconscionability.
One might also ask Justice Kagan why the federal-state law distinction is
so important in this particular context. Apart from the federal supremacy
aspect, state substantive rights to freedom from some type of categorical
discrimination (race, sex, age, disability, and so on) may be just as precious to
employees as corresponding civil rights under federal law. Finally, if Justice
Kagan insists on the presence of a federal right to offset arbitration according
to the contract's terms, why is there not a federal theory of unconscionability
under the FAA to counter the waiver of the only realistic way of vindicating
some vital substantive rights through arbitration, regardless of whether the
latter are federal or state rights? Unconscionability doctrine finds "deep roots
both in law and equity." 37 Unconscionability as a basis for not enforcing unfair
contracts is now a pervasive and well-nigh universally accepted concept. It
should be a central fixture of federal as well as state. law.
3 Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Justice
Sotomayor did not participate).
36 
Id. at 2319-20.
17 7-29 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.2 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 2002), LexisNexis
(database updated 2016). See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Congress adopted the Uniform Commercial Code with its § 2-
302 on unconscionability for the District of Columbia); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 234 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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The National Labor Relations Board has weighed in on class actions,
drawing a distinction between consumer cases and employment cases. In D.R.
Horton, Inc.,38 the Board held (3-2) that employees' rights under Section 7 of
the NLRA to engage in concerted activities includes the right to file group or
class actions. A mandatory arbitration agreement purporting to waive that right
thus violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Since this implicates a substantive
right, the Board ruled that the FAA would not require enforcement of the
arbitral agreement. In rejecting the Board's decision invalidating the class-
action waiver, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the bringing of class actions is
only a "procedural right", and therefore, the FAA's substantive support for
arbitration prevails. 39 The NLRB has stuck to its guns, reaffirming D.R.
Horton in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.4 ° In Lewis v. Epic Systems Corporation,41 the
Seventh Circuit agreed with the Board, setting up a circuit conflict that the
Supreme Court will eventually have to resolve. Several academic studies side
with the Board.
What should a court do if it concludes the arbitration provisions are so
one-sided and extensive that the unconscionability is pervasive and the
unconscionable terms cannot be severed without rewriting the contract? Upon
a court's finding of unconscionability, the Restatement and the UCC provide
that the court "may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable
term as to avoid any unconscionable result. ' '42 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and later dismissed a case where the arbitration clause shortened the
limitations period to six months, the employee had to select the arbitrator from
a list of three designated by the employer, the filing fee was $2,500, and a
38 357 N.L.R.B 2277, 2277 (2012) (3-2 decision), enforced in part and enforcement
denied in part sub nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). Accord
Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
39 D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d at 357.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (Oct. 28, 2014) (3-2 decision).
4' Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 141790 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 13, 2016); Accord Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP,
__ F.3d _ (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2016). Several academic studies also side with the Board.
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Collective Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration:
Implications of D.R. Horton and Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 182
(2014); Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted
Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1035-36 (2013);
Note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB's Determination of
Substantive Statutory Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 907,918 (2015).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Accord U.C.C. § 2-302(1)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
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losing employee had to pay the employer's costs and attorney fees. 43 The
lower federal court refused to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court would
have had to decide whether the FAA preempts California state law and
requires the severance of the unconscionable provisions and enforcement of
the agreement to arbitrate.
A holding of preemption here would not only destroy the desirable
flexibility provided to the courts in dealing with unconscionability under both
the Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code. It would also cement in
the old troublesome effect of a court choosing the compromise of severing
unconscionable clauses and enforcing the remainder of the contract. Many
uninformed employees will never challenge the unconscionable provisions
and will simply go along with the whole contract as written.
B. Arbitration of Public Law Rights Under Collective Bargaining
Agreements
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,44 the Supreme Court answered a question
that had been hanging fire for thirty-five years, since the earliest in this string
of cases dealing with the arbitration of statutory claims of employment
discrimination. 45 The Court held (5-4) that a union could waive the rights of
represented employees to take such claims to court by a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement that "clearly and unmistakably" required
them instead to use the arbitration procedures of the labor contract.
46
Pyett has had a very mixed reception. One leading scholar said the Court
had "decided that an agreement between defendants and potential defendants
can deprive a plaintiff of a congressionally authorized cause of action, forcing
plaintiffs instead into labor arbitration that a plaintiff never chose, does not
want, cannot influence, and, on the facts of the case, will never take place
41MHM Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Zaborowski, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2013),
afTd, 601 Fed. Appx. 461 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 27 (2015), cert.
dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2016).
4 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 248 (2009).
41 See supra note 18.
46 A union member also appears to retain the right to file charges with the EEOC or
the NLRB. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 272. See also Michael Z. Green, Retaliatory Employment
Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 213 (2014). Cf Wright v. Universal
Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998) (where the waiver at issue was not "clear
and unmistakable").
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anyway."4 7 But another major academic and a junior collaborator stated that
Pyett, "while not elegantly grounded in sophisticated jurisprudential
metaphysics, may nevertheless work well and yield just and fair results for
employees, employers, and unions who favor a single, integrated arbitration
forum for the resolution of all contractual and statutory claims."
4 8
We do not yet know how many unions and employers will opt to follow
Pyett. I have heard prominent union lawyers say their organizations find it
politically risky to waive members' statutory rights to take their case before a
judge and jury. Yet in many circumstances, employees might gain by having
quick and easy access to a familiar arbitral procedure, with representation by
a "repeat player" like the union. And presumably the union's agreement to
waive the judicial option could secure some return job benefits for the whole
bargaining unit. It also should not be forgotten that in Gardner-Denver-the
original case preserving a second bite at the statutory apple after the grieving
employee had lost in the arbitration of the contractual claim-the grievant lost
in his court action as well.4 9 Second bites may not be all that tasty.
Unlike in Gilmer, where the waiver of court suits was imposed by the
stronger employer party on the weaker individual employee, in Pyett the
waiver was negotiated by a labor organization chosen by a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit as their agent. In handling a represented
employee's claims, unions of course are subject to the duty of fair
representation. 50 Both the courts and the NLRB can enforce that obligation.
On balance, I am satisfied that Pyett could offer a win-win opportunity for all
parties. My major reservation is to question whether a union should be able to
waive the employees' right to sue the union itself, even though it may waive
their right to sue the employer. That may be too much of a conflict of interest.
But in any event, the duty of fair representation will be enforceable.
" Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discriminating Claims after 14 Penn Plaza v.
Pyett: Letting Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25
OHIO ST. J. DisP. RES. 975, 975 (2010).
48 David L. Gregory & Edward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory
Claims, and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 429, 429-30 (2010).
41 See supra note 18.
"°See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195-96 (1967); BARBARA T. LINDEMANN,
PAUL GROSSMANN & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 23-13
to 23-27 (5th ed. 2012).
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III. EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Pros and Cons of Mandatory Arbitration of Public Law Claims
No Supreme Court decision of the last half-century in labor and
employment law produced such a hostile outcry from relatively disinterested
sources as Gilmer's endorsement of mandatory arbitration of individual
employees' statutory claims. Numerous scholars, two federal agencies, and
two prestigious panels, one government-sponsored and one private, registered
vigorous opposition. 51 An old-fashioned, spread-eagle speaker might well
"1 See, e.g., EEOC, Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
FEP 405:7301, 405:7302 (1997); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The
Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 454 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 33 (1997); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1017 (1996); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights,
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685 (2004). In July
1997, the EEOC issued a longer and even stronger condemnation of compulsory arbitration
or pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, declaring that "even the best arbitral systems do not
afford the benefits of the judicial system." EEOC, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEP.
405:7511, 405:7520 (1997). According to the court in Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., the
NLRB General Counsel was once prepared to issue unfair labor practice complaints on the
issue. 105 F.3d 1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MGMT. REL., U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT]; National
Academy of Arbitrators, Statement on Condition of Employment Agreements, in 50
ARBITRATION 1997: THE NEXT FIFrY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 50TH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 312 (Joyce M. Najita ed. 1998). The
NAA softened its opposition somewhat on May 20, 2009, stating that "voluntary
arbitration is always preferable," and "it is desirable for employees to be allowed to opt
freely, post-dispute, for either the courts and administrative tribunals or arbitration." See
National Academy of Arbitrators, Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration (May 20,
2009), available at www.naarb.org/dueprocess/dueprocess.html.
More recently, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 13673 (July 31, 2014), 79 Fed. Reg.
45309, 45314 (Aug. 5, 2014), required all federal contracts for supplies or services in
excess of one million dollars to impose strict limits on pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
An agreement to arbitrate claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act or claims of
sexual assault or harassment may be made only with the voluntary consent of employees
and after a dispute has arisen. The Department of Labor issued rules implementing the
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have put it this way: "No honest, hard-working American should be required
to surrender a statutory right to ajury trial as the price for getting or keeping a
job." Even without the rhetorical flourish, there is much substance in that
assertion. Yet, practical experience and some reliable empirical studies over
the years make the subject considerably more complex and cloudy. Perhaps
the one proposition that all disinterested observers would accept is that there
are enormous differences between one nonunion employment arbitration and
another, depending on whether the arbitral agreements were individually
negotiated or unilaterally imposed by the employer; whether they involve an
executive, a TV anchor, or a blue-collar worker; whether substantial sums or
only modest amounts of money are at stake; whether the parties are
represented by legal or other competent counsel; how the arbitrator was
selected; how case administration is handled; how the fees and costs are
allocated; what procedures are followed; what restrictions exist (e.g., a ban on
class actions); and what remedies are available. 52 My primary concern is the
rank-and-file employee subject to an employer-mandated arbitration
arrangement. I am also less concerned with abstract theory than with practical
consequences.
Professor Alexander Colvin of Cornell, who has investigated the subject
extensively, concludes broadly that "mandatory arbitration exacerbates
inequality in access to justice in the workplace." 53 He has four specific
reasons.54 First, the employer changes the rules for enforcing rights, setting up
the arbitration system unilaterally, and often banning class actions. 55 Second,
arbitration impairs the employee's bargaining leverage by reducing the risk of
the larger damage awards that are likelier in court litigation (especially jury
trials) than in arbitration. 56 Third, the lesser economic damages in arbitration
are a disincentive for attorneys operating on contingent fees and thus a barrier
Executive Order, effective October 25, 2016. 81 Fed. Reg. 58651 (Aug. 25, 2016). The
practical effect will be a sharp reduction in the use of any arbitration in these situations.
Once a dispute has arisen and the nature of the claim is known, most employers will decline
to arbitrate small claims, knowing the employee will find it hard to get a lawyer to take the
case to court. If the claims are large ones, the employees and their lawyers will want to get
into court and before ajury. See COMMISSION OF THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 118 (1994). The cost-and-time-saving attractions of
arbitration are most appealing to both parties before the dispute occurs.
52 For an excellent overview of these differences and their significance, see generally
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment,
35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014).
11 Id. at 90.
54 Id. at 89-90.
" Id. at 89.
56 Id.
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to representation. 57 Fourth, the adoption of mandatory arbitration may have
adverse effects on the employer's internal conflict resolution procedures.
58
There is force to all these contentions but there are other offsetting factors that
must be taken into account.
Professor Colvin is largely correct on his first point about employer
unilateralism. But much of that problem could have been ameliorated by
greaterjudicial oversight and the doctrine of unconscionability, were it not for
Supreme Court decisions like Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant.
59
Moreover, Professor Colvin omits a very important consideration. I myself
have conducted only some half dozen mandatory employment arbitrations.
They were all discharge or discipline cases and, except for a case referred by
a court, they were primarily based on contract and not statutory claims. Along
with imposing an arbitration system as the means of resolving any job dispute,
the employers had adopted the policy that employees would not be discharged
or disciplined without "good cause." In effect, employees had new substantive
contract rights because the employer had chosen arbitration as the means of
enforcing all employment rights. That is not an uncommon combination.
Although "[a]round half' of the AAA cases studied by Professor Colvin
involved employment discrimination claims, another AAA study by Cornell
Professor Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill found that only 19.5% dealt
with statutory civil rights claims.61 The vast majority in the latter study were
based on individual contracts or personnel manuals. Rights in manuals would
have been employer-generated and many might not have existed but for the
contemporaneously created arbitration system.
There is no question that if employees win in a court action, they generally
receive more than when they win in an arbitration. That is especially true if it
is a jury case.62 1 have no doubt that affects what cases a lawyer undertakes on
a contingent fee. But we must be careful about a comparison of apples and
oranges when Professor Colvin finds that lawyers take on about twice the
percentage of cases that could proceed to court (15.8%) than of those that were
covered by mandatory arbitration agreements (8.1%).63 How many of the
latter claims involved such low dollar amounts that they would not have
57 Id.
581d. at90.
59 See supra text at notes 22 and 29.
60 Colvin, supra note 52, at 80.
61 Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44, 49.
62 See comments of leading management, union, and employee counsel infra Parts IV-
B, IV-C.
63 Colvin, supra note 52, at 85.
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justified the greater litigation expense of a court action? How many were
"good cause" discharge cases that might not have existed at all without the
arbitration system? 64 And any frustrated plaintiff's lawyer will tell you about
the readiness of federal judges to throw out claims on summary judgment in
cases that do reach court. In any event, another study of AAA cases concluded
that employees having less than a $60,000 annual income (or an equivalent
claim) generally cannot afford court litigation, but arbitration remains a viable
option.65 In 2013, the median income of full-time, year-round workers under
65 years of age in this country was only $45,899.66 In the informal setting of
arbitration, however, it is feasible for employees to represent themselves or
use the help of a fellow layperson or a totally inexperienced young lawyer. I
have seen it done successfully.
By now it should be clear that reputable studies in this area by respected
scholars can be remarkably divergent. In a careful, balanced study of the
relative costs of arbitration and court suits, Professor Christopher Drahozal of
the University of Kansas concluded: "The empirical evidence suggests that
arbitration may be a more accessible forum than courts for lower income
employees and consumers with small claims." 67 Lewis Maltby, President of
the National Workrights Institute, has been opposed to mandatory arbitration
as a matter of principle. Yet after studying the available data, Maltby
concluded that twice as many employees could afford to go to arbitration as
could afford court suits.
68
4 I realize there is no necessary connection between "good cause" contract rights and
mandatory arbitration. But the two often come as a pair and the coupling belongs in any
analysis of the practical realities.
65 Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP.
RESOL. J., May-Jul. 2003, at 8, 10-11.
6 Selected Characteristics of People 15 Years Old and Over by Real Money Income
in 2013, Work Experience in 2013, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Sep. 16, 2014), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/pinc-
01/2014/pincO1R 1 .xls.
67 Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical
Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 813, 840 (2008).
68 Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F.L. REV.
105, 117 (2003). In 2015, Maltby surveyed the practice of two leading plaintiffs' law firms.
Of 301 would-be employee clients who stated a valid cause of action, 112 (37%) were
turned down because their damages were inadequate or they couldn't afford counsel fees.
Inquiries were made of the 112 rejects. Of the 26 who responded, 16 (62%) were unable
to secure other counsel. Maltby summarized: "A significant number of people with
legitimate cases are denied access to justice because their cases don't have high enough
damages to interest the private bar." (Reports are on file with the author.) What if
arbitration had been available?
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Ease of access to an effective forum for redressing wrongs is important.
So are the resulting outcomes. Here too, the figures on arbitration and court
litigation are all over the plot. In different empirical studies I have reviewed,
arbitration was surprisingly favorable to employees as compared with court
litigation. 69 For higher-paid employees, probably grieving under individual
contracts, arbitral win rates in various studies ranged between about 40 and
69%. For lower-paid employees, presumably relying on handbook provisions,
arbitral win rates were between about 21 and 40%. By contrast the studies
found the figures for court cases, most of which were likely to involve higher-
paid employees, running between about 12 and 57%. It does not seem
improper for Professors David Sherwyn and Michael Heise of Cornell and
Samuel Estreicher of New York University to sum up these and other
empirical studies by stating that "there is no evidence that plaintiffs fare
significantly better in litigation [than in arbitration]." 70 At worst the
differences in outcomes for comparable groups of claimants appear negligible.
Professor Colvin's own count for employee win rates in nonunion
arbitration cases administered by AAA is 21.4%.71 I found that percentage
especially significant because I had examined 200 discharge grievances filed
from 1999 to 2007 in one of the country's oldest and most respected union-
management collectively bargained arbitration systems-truly a "gold
standard" for arbitration. Employees were reinstated or received other
substantial relief in only 46 instances, or 23% of the 200 cases. This was with
a "repeat player" union of unquestioned integrity and competence representing
the grievants. The closeness of the winning percentage there to that of the
employees in the mandated arbitrations reviewed by Colvin suggests that the
latter were not being subjected to markedly inferior treatment. I am satisfied
from both these empirical studies and my own personal experience that a
substantial number of nonunion employees, particularly those with small
financial claims, have a realistic opportunity to pursue their rights through
mandatory arbitration that otherwise would not exist.
B. Due Process
Elsewhere, I have considered more extensively the due process
requirements without which any employment arbitration may amount to a
69 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past
Quarter Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411,419 (2010), and authorities cited.
70 David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1557,
1578 (2005).
71 Colvin, supra note 52, at 80.
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sham. 72 Three quite diverse groups have developed rather similar procedural
standards for protecting employees' rights in these proceedings. They are the
so-called Dunlop Commission; 73 the Task Force on Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Employment, which drafted the much-used but now somewhat
antiquated Employment Due Process Protocol;74 and the National Academy
of Arbitrators, with two separate sets of Guidelines. 75 The most recent
Academy Guidelines, approved by the Board of Governors in May 2014, are
probably the most comprehensive and overlap the Dunlop Commission Report
and the Due Process Protocol in major respects. They provide inter alia:
76
* The arbitrator must decline any case in which the arbitral
system would deny a party due process.
* Arbitrators must know the method of their appointment and
cannot take a case if selected by one party or from a panel
created by one party.
77
* The arbitrator has an extensive and continuing obligation of
written disclosure to the parties or an appointing agency of all
personal, social, professional, financial, or other interests
related to a party, representative, or known witness, or any
other circumstances that might raise a reasonable doubt about
the arbitrator's independence or impartiality.
72 See St. Antoine, supra note 69, at 421-33.
71 See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 51.
74 TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING
OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL],
http://naarb.org/protocol.asp. The Task Force consisted of management, union, and
plaintiffs' attorneys from the American Bar Association and the National Employment
Lawyers Association, and representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
7' NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION, http://naarb.org/dueprocess.asp; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS,
GUIDELINES FOR STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS IN
MANDATORY EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION, http://naarb.org/Guidelines for standards.asp.
76 See generally Barry Winograd, Developing Standards of Professional
Responsibility for Arbitrators in Mandatory Employment Arbitration Proceedings, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 61 (2014) (showing historical development of ethical
standards).
77 See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004). Cf Hooters
of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999) (arbitrator-selection panel
invalid when established solely by employer).
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* If a conflict of interest exists, the arbitrator must decline an
appointment, even if all parties waive objection. An arbitrator
must withdraw upon a party's timely objection after
disclosure, without the need for the party to provide any
reason.
" One party may be made solely responsible for all arbitral fees
by law, agency rules, or agreement of the parties.
78
* Arbitrators must inform an unrepresented party that they are
neutral and not representing either party, but they may explain
the arbitration process to an unrepresented party.
* The arbitrator may order such discovery as seems necessary
for a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute,
consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.
* Arbitrators must make a reasonable effort to address and
follow public law whenever public law is at issue in a case. I
personally would let the parties narrow the issues and insist
that I stick to interpreting and applying the contract; the
parties could then have a court address legal issues if
necessary. But increasingly, especially in public-sector cases
and certainly in federal cases, it is generally assumed that the
arbitrator will apply public law.
* Advance deposits for arbitrator fees may be required as a
condition for going forward with the arbitration. Deposits
must be secured and set aside until the fees are earned.
* Arbitrators must give notice to all parties, and an opportunity
to respond, if they believe a case should be decided on a
rationale not previously presented by any party.
" Consent awards are permitted if the arbitrator is satisfied that
all parties knowingly agreed (and I would add "and seem fair
to the arbitrator"). This does not apply to class actions.
* Post-award clarification of the merits is not permitted unless
all parties agree but an arbitrator can retain jurisdiction to
clarify the interpretation or implementation of the remedy.
* Ex parte communications are prohibited, even those
regarding compensation, despite desires to spare one side
embarrassment. (Would it make a difference if an arbitrator
never tries to hold the other side responsible on ajoint liability
theory for the nonpaying side's portion?)
7 This is contrary to the Due Process Protocol, but the Protocol was undercut on this
point by the Cole decision, 106 F.3d at 1484-85.
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* Arbitrators may accept or even suggest mediation but they
must be clear about the rules of the process, including ex parte
communications (allowable), and the consequences of a
failure in the mediation, including the subsequent role of the
arbitrator.
* Arbitrators cannot publish an award without the consent of all
parties.
* Arbitrators cannot voluntarily participate in legal proceedings
for enforcing an award.
The Academy guidelines say nothing about an arbitrator's handling of a
case in which the agreement to arbitrate waives an employee's right to
maintain a class action. At the time that issue did not seem as pressing as it
became subsequently. Also, in most discharge cases, which are the most
common type of grievance, the claim is unique to the individual and not
suitable for a class action, and it is important enough for nearly all employees
to pursue on their own.
The second set of NAA Guidelines was originally drafted to be a code of
binding rules for employment arbitrators, paralleling the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes.7 9 The latter
Code has been jointly adopted by the NAA, the American Arbitration
Association, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The Code is
subject to enforcement in various ways, including reprimand, suspension, or
expulsion by the Academy or suspension or disbarment from arbitration panels
by the two designating or appointing agencies. The Academy's enforcement
body is the Committee on Professional Responsibility and Grievances.
After discussions with the NAA Board of Governors, however, it was
decided for a variety of reasons to make the new proposed set of standards
merely guidelines and not formally binding rules. For those Academy
members who believe that members handling employment arbitrations should
be subject to sanctions for wrongdoing, there was comfort in the increasing
recognition that both the history and express wording of the Code for labor
arbitrators (see the "Foreword" and "Preamble - Background, Scope of
Code") support the view that it is equally applicable to employment arbitrators.
Neither the NAA nor the AAA has taken any official position on this issue.
The FMCS rarely handles employment arbitrations.
9 The Code is also available on the NAA website at http://naarb.org/code.asp.
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IV. THE PRACTITIONERS SPEAK
A. Background
The College of Labor and Employment Lawyers describes itself as a
"fellowship of the most accomplished members of the labor and employment
law community." 80 The approximately 1,380 Fellows include mostly
management, union, and employee attorneys, with some neutrals (arbitrators
and mediators), law professors, and government officials, along with a few
honorary members such as judges. All Fellows are chosen after a careful and
extensive vetting by current members. I thought the knowledge and experience
of this selective group would be a fruitful source of insight about the current
state of labor and employment arbitration in this country. My aim was not a
scientifically constructed survey or statistically significant poll but rather the
thoughts of some distinguished practitioners whose merits I could personally
vouch for. I sent separate sets of questionnaires to about seventy-five persons,
either management attorneys or attorneys for unions and employees. I received
fifty-two responses, almost equally divided between the two groups.
B. Management Lawyers' Views
All but two of my twenty-seven management respondents had nonunion
clients with mandatory arbitration agreements. The practice is pervasive,
covering an average of about half the lawyers' clientele. At one time or another
twenty-one employer lawyers had recommended such agreements for clients
and twelve had recommended against them. Some lawyers thus have done
both, depending on the client and other circumstances (including changes of
mind). A few stated they would spell out the pros and cons and let the client
decide without a definite recommendation. All twenty-one who favored
mandatory arbitration cited the cost and bother of court litigation. Twelve
observed that courts and juries generally awarded higher amounts than
arbitrators. Four candidly declared that union-avoidance was a motivation. A
number mentioned the privacy and speed of arbitration. Several commented
that arbitration was easier for employees and its availability was good for
employee morale. Somewhat surprisingly, only three lawyers volunteered,
without my inquiring, that the banning of class actions in arbitration was a
factor. More may well have agreed if I had specifically asked that question.
80 THE COLLEGE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS,
http://www.laborandemploymentcollege.org/about-the-college/mission (last visited Oct.
1,2016).
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All the management lawyers recommending against or opposing
mandatory arbitration said they wanted summary judgment and arbitrators
rarely granted it, and they wanted the full right of appeal for any adverse
decisions. Arbitration awards of course are subject to very limited court
review. Over half the negative group pointed out that more employees are
likely to arbitrate than to sue. A few felt that employees won too often at
arbitration and others commented that many arbitrators decide cases on the
basis of "fairness" and they preferred judges who are more likely to decide on
the basis of the "law." Some noted that the increasing expense of arbitration
was reducing the cost advantage it once had over court litigation.
On a significant subject, the answers ranged from "0%" to "100%" to my
query: In what percentage of the nonunion employment arbitration cases you
have handled was public law (Title VII, ADEA, FMLA etc.) rather than
employee handbooks or employer policies the principal issue? The mean
average was about 69%. The predominance of civil rights or statutory claims
rather than common law contract claims is quite contrary to earlier studies and
my own experience 8 1 and more in accord with the findings of Professor Colvin
that "[a]round half of all mandatory arbitration cases... involve employment
discrimination claims." 82 If the latter calculation is accurate and generally
applicable today, it does reduce the force of my argument that mandatory
arbitration does not impinge all that much on statutory enforcement
procedures and very often provides new reciprocal contractual "just cause"
substantive rights.
Turning to traditional collective bargaining arbitration, fifteen of the
twenty-seven management lawyers thought that its rate or frequency of use
had remained about the same over the last ten-twenty years. Nine of those
responding believed there had been significantly less use. I would agree with
the observation that even where the rate of filing for arbitrations has held up,
there has been a marked trend toward more settlements prior to any scheduled
hearing.
When I asked about specific complaints concerning traditional labor
arbitration, there were remarkably few. One person thought the process took
too long. Two felt it had become too legalistic or complex. Three believed
arbitrators charged too much. Five considered mediation a superior means for
resolving disputes. Could this broad lack of grievances be explained by the
successful, prestigious nature of the group I was soliciting for opinions? In any
event, a few were more outspoken when I asked open-endedly about any other
complaints or concerns. The nature or quality of the union involved was said
81 See supra text at notes 59-61.
82 See Colvin, supra note 52, at 80.
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to make a big difference in all aspects of the relationship, including arbitration.
Unions can file grievances on a reasonable basis or as a harassment device,
they declared. Union leadership may have suffered because of money
shortages and because talented younger people no longer aspired to official
roles in their unions. Arbitration is less needed because the parties have
become more experienced in predicting outcomes and can settle cases on their
own. It takes too long to get an experienced arbitrator in a case. Arbitrators
still like to "split the baby," as in awarding reinstatement without back pay.
(Some of us believe that in certain circumstances that can be exactly the
appropriate award and not a pandering compromise.) The NLRB was said to
be less ready now to defer to arbitration.
These management lawyers reported that in most traditional labor
arbitrations, public law as distinguished from contract law based on the
collective bargaining agreement played little or no role. I calculated the mean
average of the individuals' arbitrations in which public law was the principal
issue as about 12%. Eight of the twenty-seven employer attorneys had
unionized clients with so-called Pyett agreements, requiring individual
employees to abide by the collective bargaining procedures for arbitration of
statutory claims rather than take such cases to court. But for those with such
clients, a mean average of about 50% of their individual clients had Pyett
agreements.
Subsequently, I asked about any general observations concerning
arbitration or union-management relations. Several commented on the need to
get good new arbitrators to replace those retiring from the scene, and on the
vital importance as well of getting these newcomers known to the labor and
employment community through "meet and greet" sessions and the like. Some
management attorneys believe that unions are not responding adequately to
the new and different needs of today's workforce. Others focused on complex
arbitrations and suggested that unions should be sure to use lawyers or
professional consultants for such cases. In summing up the virtues of
mandatory arbitration for management, the group emphasized the avoidance
of "runaway juries," and the well-recognized value of jointly selecting the
decision-maker, controlling scheduling, and maintaining privacy and
informality-despite the continuing problems of delay and cost. Overall, the
responses were fairly optimistic about arbitration.
This twenty-seven-person group of management lawyers spent a mean
average of approximately 38% of their time on traditional union-management
practice (organizing, negotiation, arbitration etc.), and approximately 61% of
their time on nonunion employment matters (statutory claims, employer
policies, nonunion arbitration, etc.). That should be no surprise in this era of
union decline. They also spent a mean average of approximately 87% of their
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time in the private sector and only 13% of their time in the public sector. Since
the public-sector union workforce now slightly exceeds the private-sector
union workforce, there must be some special reasons that this select group
spends so much more time in the private sector. Factors might include greater
employment compression in the public sector (fewer units than in the private
sector, enabling more efficient servicing); the greater acceptance of unionism
in those parts of the public sector where it has been established and thus fewer
life-or-death legal problems); and a tendency of the ablest lawyers to gravitate
toward the private sector's more remunerative practice.
C. Views of Union/Employee Lawyers
Twenty-five lawyers representing unions or employees responded to my
survey. Five of those do no union-management labor relations work. The
remaining twenty took a dimmer view of the current state of traditional
collective bargaining labor arbitration than did the management
representatives. Only six on the union side thought the frequency of arbitration
was about the same as ten to twenty years ago, while fourteen believed there
was substantially less use. Complaints were numerous. Arbitration takes too
long (twelve responders). It has become too legalistic or complex (ten) and
arbitrators cost too much (ten). Five persons considered mediation generally a
superior mode of dispute resolution. More general comments included the
notion that arbitrators were now less sympathetic to workers in discharge cases
than formerly, perhaps because of economic or generational changes. Others
said arbitrators' written opinions too often merely repeat the parties'
arguments and do not provide carefully reasoned analyses.
Union lawyers estimated that in traditional collective bargaining
arbitration, public law rather than the parties' labor contract was the principal
issue in a mean average of 21.6% of the cases (the management lawyers had
estimated 12%). Five lawyers had union clients with Pyett agreements,
requiring employees to follow contractual arbitration procedures rather than
sue on statutory claims. No lawyers recommended that their union clients seek
such a provision. But one lawyer commented that the bargaining unit received
a good quid pro quo for agreeing to a Pyett provision, and that probably more
employees could get to arbitration with union representation than could afford
to go to court.
Eleven of these twenty-five lawyers had represented nonunion employees
in arbitrations under mandatory employment arbitration agreements. They
estimated that in a mean average of 60% of the cases, public law rather than
contract law (employee handbooks, employer policies, oral commitments,
etc.) was the principal issue (management lawyers had a mean average of
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68.7% public law). My survey asked how they felt a court would likely have
ruled for or against the employees in comparison with the arbitrator in their
nonunion cases. Four said about the same; three, a court was more likely to
rule for the employees (but one qualified that a jury more likely but not a
judge); and three, a court was less likely to rule forthe employees. I then asked,
assuming an employee "won," whether arbitrator or court was likely to provide
the more extensive remedy. One said about the same; six, a court (again, one
said ajury but not ajudge); and two, the arbitrator. Several lawyers added that
courts issue many more summary judgments than arbitrators.
The estimated division of time spent by these union/employee lawyers on
traditional union-management matters (organizing, negotiation, labor
arbitration, etc.) and on nonunion matters (statutory claims, employer policies,
nonunion employment arbitration, etc.) was 60%-40%. That is almost the
exact reverse of the figures for management attorneys, 38%-61%. And that is
despite the fact that five persons in the union/employee group do no
conventional labor relations work at all. But on further reflection a 60-40
distribution of work between "labor" and "employment" should not be
surprising for this particular set of lawyers. There is simply more nonunion
employment law work to be done on the management side. For employers, the
decline of unions since the 1.950s, the broad expansion of federal statutes
dealing with job discrimination, occupational safety and health, pension
reform, and common-law wrongful discharge developments all tilted work law
sharply away from the former emphasis on union-management relations. For
labor organizations, however, the older, different emphasis largely remains.
Most union-and-employee-side members of the College of Labor and
Employment Lawyers continue in a milieu more similar to that earlier, less
variegated era.
V. CONCLUSION
These days there is much talk about income inequality, and in certain
circles even much talk about the need for working people to enjoy a living
wage and human dignity. Indeed, Professor Colvin's cumulative objections to
mandatory employment arbitration are summed up by saying it "exacerbates
inequality in access to justice in the workplace." 83 The more the facts would
bear out those assertions, the more I would agree with Colvin. But I find the
evidence very mixed and inconclusive.
Colvin is surely correct that employers' unilateral imposition of a
particular arbitration system enables them to include provisions tilting the
83 Colvin, supra note 52, at 90.
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playing field in their favor. More vigorous judicial oversight through the well-
established doctrine of unconscionability would have greatly reduced the risk
of unfairness in mandatory arbitration, were it not for the overly broad reading
of the Federal Arbitration Act by Justice Scalia and the then-existing five-
person majority of the Supreme Court in Concepcion and Italian Colors
Restaurant. 84 Even so, many mandatory arbitration systems have been
accompanied by provisions highly favorable to employees, namely, requiring
good cause for discharge or discipline. That is a major benefit for nonunion
workers in at-will-employment America. Professor Colvin may be right that
earlier studies exaggerated the percentage of arbitration claims based on
contract (employee handbooks and the like); he concluded that statutory
claims were 54% of the total under employer-promulgated plans.85 That does
add to the practical significance of the decision in Gilmer to allow one of two
parties in an employment relationship to require the enforcement of sensitive
public rights by private means. It still leaves up to some 40% of arbitration
claims based on employer-granted contract rights, which is a substantial
number. In the handful of mandatory arbitration cases I myself have handled,
the primary issue in all but one was a contract claim derived from a personnel
manual, not a statutory claim. These contract claims might not have existed
but for the accompanying arbitration provisions. And even a statutory claim
might not have been worth the cost of a court action but could have been worth
pursuing in arbitration.
I have no doubt that if an employee has a large monetary claim and can
manage to get by the summary-judgment stage where so many federal cases
end, ajury trial is likely to produce a bigger award than an arbitration. Almost
any plaintiff's lawyer operating on a contingent fee basis will naturally prefer
a court action if there is sizable potential liability. Yet my principal concern is
the lower-paid, blue-collar worker who does not have a substantial monetary
claim but whose job and livelihood are at stake. And I have seen nothing that
refutes the AAA study concluding that employees having less than a $60,000
annual income generally cannot afford court litigation.86 That is the economic
zone where most rank-and-filers live, many not that far above the poverty line.
For them arbitration remains the most viable option. Whatever may be the
theoretical or practical objections to mandatory employment arbitration, I have
seen nothing that would offset the pragmatic grounds for allowing its
84 See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351-52 (2011);
American Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
85 Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What Kind
of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 59, 68
(2014).
86 Hill, supra note 65, at 10-11.
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continuation, subject to appropriate due process requirements. It can often be
the sole route to justice for the neediest.
What about the future of traditional collective-bargaining labor
arbitration? Despite a decline of about 50% in the issuance of arbitration
awards from the 1970s to the present, the members of the College of Labor
and Employment Lawyers who responded to my survey were rather upbeat
concerning the process. This was especially true on the management side. A
comfortable majority (15-9) of the employer lawyers thought the frequency
of labor arbitration use had remained about the same over the last 10-20 years.
Union counsel were less sanguine, thirteen out of twenty believing there was
significantly less use. Union attorneys also had more complaints about the
length, complexity, and cost of arbitration. Five lawyers in each group felt that
mediation was a superior method of dispute resolution. But I consider it
meaningful that, when I asked for open-ended comments by this select group,
no one on either side suggested the imminent demise of the process or pointed
to fatal defects in it. Of course the very fact this was an elite, successful group
may have made for a more positive outlook than might be found among labor
practitioners generally.
So, how do I answer my own question: are today's systems of labor and
employment arbitration in a midlife crisis or headed for a new golden age? On
the evidence before us, I believe a good argument could be made for either or
both positions as to both systems-simultaneously! And there are significant
implications for the profession of private arbitrators. Specifically, the future
of labor arbitration as now conducted by unions and management will turn on
what happens to the various possible forms of employee representation. In
recent years a spate of books and articles has reviewed the changes in the
workplace wrought by the so-called "gig economy," including contingent
employees, independent contractors, and subcontracting, and by franchising,
automation, and work centers catering to union employees' economic and
legal needs but generally disclaiming collective bargaining.8 7 The basic notion
is that the old system of employee organization and representation under the
NLRA simply does not fit the new world of diffused and shifting employment.
" See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010); Samuel Estreicher, "Easy In, Easy Out": A
Future for U.S. Workplace Representation, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1615 (2014); Janice Fine,
New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States,
66 REL. INDUSTR1ELLES/INDUS. REL. 604 (2011); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee
Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REv. 655
(2010); Noam Scheiber & Brian X. Chen, In Verizon Strike, Blue-Collar Stress Hits
Sidewalks, N. Y. TIMES, April 14, 2016, at B1.
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There has even been involvement by state and municipal governments in
private employment dispute resolution.
88
It may well be that the former dichotomous distinction between labor law
and employment law is breaking down. 89 In any event, I remain cautiously
optimistic that over time, our political and legal system does respond to the
legitimate needs and demands of large numbers of the citizenry. That is shown
even by our recent otherwise inglorious presidential nominating campaigns.
Income inequality and other job inequities have become widely recognized as
subjects requiring much more attention. And individuals usually find strength
in groupings, in one form or another. Unions dealing with employers at given
geographic work sites may have to give way to new types of employee or
worker associations operating across broader industry lines. But the need for
problem-solving and dispute-resolution systems will continue.
One development in alternative dispute resolution might be an extension
of the increasingly popular resort to mediation. In mediation a neutral third
party does not impose a particular solution on the contending parties but seeks
to get them to agree on a voluntary settlement. Yet human nature being what
it is, many cases will defy closure consummated by the participants
themselves. Something in the nature of arbitration and decisions by neutral
outsiders will persist. Regardless of whether we call the disputants unions and
employers or just claimants and something else, whether or not government
plays an ever more significant part, and whether the process is known as labor
or employment arbitration or simply workplace dispute resolution, an essential
feature is likely to remain a system of private neutrals providing fair and timely
decisions covering the appropriate segment of working persons. 9' If the
inquiries I receive from many people, both young and not so young, are any
8 See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE
WAR ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER (2016)
(discussing the importance of government in promoting social and economic progress);
Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011) (declaring that primacy of federal labor law has not prevented
cities and states from working with unions and employers to reorder union organizing and
bargaining rules).
9 See, e.g., Alan Hyde, The Idea of the Idea of Labour Law: A Parable, in THE IDEA
OF LABOUR LAW 88 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011); JACOB ROSENFELD,
WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO (2014); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008).
" Even in government-sponsored arbitration tribunals or the equivalent under the
Railway Labor Act and the Labor Management Relations Act, nongovernmental neutrals
are appointed in the more contentious grievance cases and in national emergency disputes.
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS § 4.28-§ 4.37 (Kenneth May ed., 7th ed.
2012).
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indication, this country has an abundance of able, responsible individuals who
are eager for such assignments. Arbitrators should still find themselves playing
a very worthy and rewarding role.
